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The Gold Market at the Paris Stock Exchange: 
A Risk-Return Analysis 1950-2003 
Thi Hong Van Hoang  
Abstract: »Der Goldmarkt an der Pariser Börse: Eine Rendite-Risiko-Analyse 
1950-2003«. This paper aims to study the return of investment in gold assets 
quoted at the Paris stock exchange during 54 years, from 1950 to 2003. Con-
trarily to what is thought about this mythical metal, its risk-return is very infe-
rior to other financial assets (stocks and bonds). While it has a high degree of 
risk, its return is less than that of the risk-free asset. Moreover for individual 
investors, investment in gold has given a very low result in real terms. A capi-
tal of 100 new francs invested in the gold coin napoleon in December 1949 
would have been liquidated for 56 new francs in December 2003. So its real 
rate of return was -1% per year.  
Keywords: Paris gold market, risk-return, purchasing power. 
Introduction 
Gold is a precious and mythical metal, which has always presented many fac-
ets. During the 19th and the 20th centuries, it assumed three roles: metal, 
money and financial asset. Since the announcement by American President 
Nixon on August 15th, 1971 of the end of the convertibility between gold and 
the American dollar, gold has lost its international monetary role and has rein-
forced its role as financial asset.  
Contrarily to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) rules during the period 
of Bretton-Woods fixed rate exchange regime, France opened an official gold 
market at the Paris Stock Exchange on February 13th, 1948. Trade in gold 
became free again after a prohibition period since 1939. But the permitted 
transactions were only internal, imports and exports were forbidden. At the 
opening of this market, trades in gold were anonymous and were not taxed. In 
January 1977, a tax applying on gold sales was introduced at a rate of 4% that 
was successively increased to the present level of 7.5% (with 0.5% of commis-
sion costs, the total charge becomes 8%). The main gold assets quoted at the 
Paris Stock Exchange were the bar (12 kilos), the ingot (1 kilo) and many coins 
among which the most popular and the most traded was the 20 francs coin, 
called “napoléon”.  
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In July 2004, Euronext Paris announced the end of the gold market at the 
Paris Stock Exchange because of the fading away of participants.  
This paper about this particular market aims to answer three principal ques-
tions: 
1) How did this market work and how did it evolve?  
2) What has been the risk-return trade-off of the gold assets?  
3) Why has this market been closed in July 2004?  
With these objectives, the paper is structured as follows. 
A first section presents the essential points of the functioning of this market. 
A second section describes the database and the evolution of the market. A 
third section shows the risk-return trade-off of the gold assets in comparison 
with stocks and bonds quoted at the Paris Stock Exchange. A fourth section 
answers the question about the evolution of the purchasing power of gold in-
vestments. Finally, it is concluded with explanations of the reasons for which 
Paris’s gold market has been closed in July 2004. 
The functioning of the gold market at the Paris Stock 
Exchange 
The opening of an official gold market in France was authorized by the law1 of 
February 2nd, 1948. Holding, trade and circulation of gold became free again 
after a ten-year prohibition period which started with the Second World War in 
1939. But exchanges with foreign markets were forbidden. Transactions were 
anonymous and were not taxed. The gold market was officially opened on 
February 13th, 1948 in the Palais Brongniart under the authority of “La 
Chambre Syndicale des Agents de Change”. 
The gold assets were traded on a special pit, called “corbeille2”. Contrarily 
to the case of stocks and bonds, the traders on the pit were not only stockbro-
kers (agents de change) but also representatives of banks or financial institu-
tions especially authorized by “La Chambre Syndicale des Agents de Change”.  
The technique of quotation was the usual one at the Paris Stock Exchange: 
an open outcry for a fixing taking place from 12.30 pm to 1.30 pm3. The quotes 
(first, highest, lowest and last) were published in the official “Bulletin de la 
Cote” published by “La Chambre Syndicale des Agents de Change”. These 
quotes have followed the changes of the France’s monetary units: from 1948 to 
1959 in “old francs”; from 1960 to 1998 in “new francs”; since January 1999 in 
euros. Contrarily to the London gold market, the most important gold market in 
                                                             
1  Law of February 2nd, 1948 in “Journal Officiel”, source: Archives of Bank of France. 
2  Cf. Rules of Gold Market at the Paris Stock Exchange edited by “La Chambre Syndicale 
des Agents de Change”, source: Archives of Bank of France. 
3  This schedule was changed over the time.  
 391
the world, quotation at Paris Stock Exchange was not in ounce4 but in kilo (for 
bars and ingots) and coins were transacted by unit5. 
This was a cash market. Payments and delivery were taking place on the fol-
lowing day. The advantage of this regulated market was the existence of strict 
rules (contrarily to the vagueness during the 19th century6) insuring the quality 
and the weight of the traded gold assets7. 
Table 1 below presents the main gold assets that were traded. The most 
traded assets were the gold ingot (1 kg, mostly for wealthy investors) and the 
20 francs gold coin called “napoléon”8 (6.4 grams with 5.8 grams of fine gold, 
for small investors). Bars of 12 kg were also quoted but less regularly (because 
of its very high value). The English coins, “sovereign”, are those stamped since 
the Monetary Law of June 22nd, 1816. Coins from the Latin Union (stamped in 
Austria, Hungary, Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Monaco, Romany, Russia, 
Sardinia, Serbia) were also quoted. 
From 1948 to 2004, three important legal events have had a very strong in-
fluence on the market behavior. 
First, on January 31st, 1967, the prohibition of gold trading with foreign 
markets was removed9. The objective was to induce foreigners to trade in Paris. 
Unluckily, this aim was not attained because foreign investors preferred to 
trade on other markets like London or Zurich. The trade volume on bars of 
international specification was so small that this “opened market” could not be 
maintained any more. Finally, in December 1968, the prohibition to trade gold 
with foreigners was re-instituted10. 
The second important event has been the taxation. For 29 years (from 1948 
to 1976), gold holding has been the unique financial asset to avoid all taxes. 
This “fiscal paradise” ended in January 1977 when a 4% tax on all sale values 
was introduced. It had an overwhelming effect on the market since the transac-
tions dropped by 124% during the first 1977 quarter compared to the same one 
of 1976. As usual, when a tax is introduced, its trend is the increase in rates, as 
the following table shows. 
                                                             
4  1 ounce = 31,10348 grams. 
5  Coins usually include a premium over their metal value. (Cf. Section 2). 
6  Cf. Boyer-Xambeu, Deleplace and Gillard (2007).  
7  For details on these rules, see “Rules of Gold Market at Paris Stock Exchange”, loc. cit. 
Source: Archives of Bank of France.  
8  Contrarily to its name “napoléon”, this coin has been stamped during all the 19th and 20th 
centuries. 
9  Law of December 28th, 1966 in “Journal Officiel”, source: Archives of Bank of France. 
10  Decree of May 29th, 1968 in “Journal Officiel”, source: Archives of Bank of France. 
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Table 1: Main gold assets quoted at the Paris Stock Exchange 
Definition Current Appellation Content of fine gold in grammes or title 
900/1000 
916/1000 Bar (12 kg) 
 995/1000 
Ingot (1 kg)  995/1000 
French coins (20 francs) Napoleon or Louis 5.80645 
French coins (10 francs) Half-napoleon 2.90322 
Swiss coins (20 francs) Vreneli 5.80645 
Latin Union coins  5.80645 
English coins (£20) Sovereign 7.3224 
English coins (£10) Half-Sovereign 3.6612 
American coins ($20) Double-Eagle 30.0926 
American coins ($10) Eagle 15.0463 
Table 2: French fiscal regime on sales of gold 
Date Inclusive tax on gold sales 
1st July 1977 4% 
21st January 1981 6% 
1st January 1985 6.5% 
1st January 1986 7% 
1st January 1992 7.5% 
 
Thirdly, in the same objective of taxation, the anonymity of transactions was 
suppressed with the decree11 of September 30th, 1981. This decree obliges any 
person who makes any transaction on gold to record its identity in a register. 
This makes tax control much easier and effective. It resulted in a further drop 
in transactions volume: 61% during the last 1981 quarter compared to the third 
one of the same year. In order to prevent a total collapse of the market, ano-
nymity was reintroduced when the Right Wing won the elections in 198612. 
                                                             
11  Decree of September 30th, 1981 in “Journal Officiel”, source: Archives of Bank of France. 
12  Decree of May 21st, 1986 in “Journal Officiel”, source: Archives of Bank of France. 
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The uneven evolution of the Paris Stock Exchange Gold 
Market, from 1950 to 2003 
Data 
To our knowledge, there was no exhaustive database on this subject. So, we 
collected information from the press, pamphlets and archives bearing on the 56 
years of existence of the Paris gold market. The data collected and its sources 
are presented in Appendix 1. 
This database13 contains the end-of-month quotes of the four main gold as-
sets quoted at the Paris Stock Exchange (bar, ingot, “napoleon” and “sover-
eign” coins); the values of indices of French stocks and bonds and the short-
term rate of interest14. 
The time period analyzed starts in December 1949 (almost two years after 
the opening of the market) because this date is the beginning of the indices that 
are needed for comparison and references. It terminates in December 2003 
because the conventional yearly measure is used while the market was closed 
effectively in July 2004. Nominal quotes are transformed in indices to have the 
same base of 100 on December 1949 for all series. 
The 1950-2003 uneven evolution of the gold market at the Paris 
Stock Exchange 
The Figure 1 (next page) presents the evolution of the two main gold assets 
(ingot and napoleon) quoted at the Paris Stock Exchange15. It shows two facts 
of which the first is very unusual because it is an artifact. It looks as if the four 
main gold assets follow the same pattern. But this is not at all confirmed by the 
measures presented in Table 3 below.  
                                                             
13  The author whishes to heavily thank the members of the “Services des Archives” at the 
Bank of France for their help and advices which ensured the success of this painful data 
collection.  
14  This hand-made database contains approximately more than 6000 observations.  
15  We would have liked to present the evolution of the two other assets (bar and sovereign). 
But, on the graph, the four evolutions are too similar and are not distinguishable between 
them even if the “landscape” format is used.  
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Table 3: Measures of correlation between the monthly returns of the four main 
gold assets from 1950 to 2003 
Between Correlation coefficient R² 
Bar-Ingot 0.98 0.96 
Bar-Napoleon 0.74 0.56 
Bar-Sovereign 0.77 0.60 
Ingot-Napoleon 0.76 0.57 
Ingot-Sovereign 0.78 0.61 
Napoleon-Sovereign 0.73 0.53 
 
Undoubtedly, with an R-square of 0.96, the bar and the ingot have the same 
behavior, which reflects the forces of supply and demand for “pure” gold. On 
the other hand, the returns of the bar and ingot are quite different from those of 
the coins with a R-square almost divided by two. The reason is well-known by 
practitioners: the gold coins have a value different from that of their real fine 
gold weight (as measured by the price of ingot) because of the extrinsic quality 
of the coin and the beauty of the stamped figure. This phenomenon is called the 
“premium” (“la prime” in French). 
The unexpected small relationship between napoleons and sovereigns (R-
square=0.53) is due to the fact that since the first petroleum shock, their two 
behaviors have been quite different. Especially during two periods: from March 
1974 to March 1979 and from December 1979 to June 1983 when the napo-
leon’s returns fluctuated much more than the sovereign ones. In spite of the 
lack of data on transactions, one may suppose that most of the trades involved 
the napoleon coins. 
Second learning of the Figure 1: it shows clearly three distinct sub-periods 
of which the monthly return parameters are presented in Table 4 (next page).  
The first period from 1950 to August 1971 could be qualified as “pre-
petroleum shocks”. The Paris gold market was quite stable during this period. 
The second period is the “two-petroleum shocks” from September 1971 to 
September 1981. The returns and the level of risk have been stupendous: 
around 30% for the annualized returns and 25% for the annualized risk. An-
other important reason for this gold market increase was the announcement of 
American President Nixon of the end of the convertibility between gold and 
dollar on August 15th, 1971. So, gold became a free merchandise liker any 
other. The third period is characterized by a “lengthy decline” from October 
1981 to December 1992 (decrease by 58% for napoleon coins) and then by 
twelve years of stability (the napoleon index was 1021 at the end of July 1993 
and was 926 in December 2003). Although this period has been full of political 
and economic events, the gold market did not really respond to them. It seems 
that, at least, it has lost its image of “safety-asset”. One may wonder if this is 
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not linked to the coming of a new generation of investors who were born after 
WWII.  
As it is important to statistically prove that these “obvious” sub-periods are 
not an artifact, the usual tests comparing first the variances (as risk measure), 
then average return of the different sub-periods were performed (Table 5 be-
low). The basic result is that the sub-period 2 is distinctly different from the 
two others. The difference between sub-periods 1 and 3 is less clear cut. Curi-
ously, the bar and the ingot have had a different risk level but it is not the case 
for the napoleon and the sovereign. On the other hand, their average returns 
have all been statistically different between these two sub-periods 1 and 3. 
Table 4: Risk-return for the whole period and the three sub-periods 
   Monthly values Annualized results 
 Periods Gold Assets Average return Risk Average return Risk 
 Whole period  In % In % In % In % 
 Bar 0.50 4.82 5.95 16.70 
 Ingot 0.49 4.70 5.87 16.26 
 Napoleon 0.46 4.87 5.48 16.86 
 
12/1949-12/2003 
Sovereign 0.47 4.80 5.69 16.61 
1 Sub-period 1      
 Bar 0.12 3.04 1.43 10.52 
 Ingot 0.12 2.97 1.44 10.30 
 Napoleon 0.21 3.61 2.47 12.49 
 
12/1949-08/1971 
Sovereign 0.19 3.82 2.26 13.25 
2 Sub-period 2      
 Bar 2.43 7.47 29.14 25.89 
 Ingot 2.42 7.26 29.00 25.15 
 Napoleon 2.56 7.78 30.71 26.96 
 
09/1971-09/1981 
Sovereign 2.39 7.50 28.63 25.99 
3 Sub-period 3      
 Bar -0.01 4.50 -0.16 15.58 
 Ingot -0.02 4.38 -0.30 15.16 
 Napoleon -0.25 3.88 -3.01 13.45 
 
10/1981-12/2003 
Sovereign -0.11 3.77 -1.35 13.06 
The computations are made on monthly returns. For a better understanding of the values 
obtained, the results are annualized: annualized return=monthly return*12; annualized risk = 
monthly standard-deviation* 12 . 
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Table 5: Statistical comparisons of the risk-return parameters between the sub-
periods 
  Variance (Fisher test) Average return 
Gold assets Difference between F-test value Yes/No Test value Yes/No 
Bar sub-periods (1) vs (2) 6.06*** Yes -3.27*** Yes 
 sub-periods (1) vs (3) 2.19*** Yes 0.4 No 
 sub-periods (2) vs (3) 2.76*** Yes 3.33*** Yes 
Ingot sub-periods (1) vs (2) 5.96*** Yes -3.35*** Yes 
 sub-periods (1) vs (3) 2.17*** Yes 0.44 No 
 sub-periods (2) vs (3) 2.75*** Yes 3.43*** Yes 
Napoleon sub-periods (1) vs (2) 4.65*** Yes -3.17*** Yes 
 sub-periods (1) vs (3) 1.16 No 1.4 No 
 sub-periods (2) vs (3) 4.02*** Yes 3.77*** Yes 
Sovereign sub-periods (1) vs (2) 3.85*** Yes -3.04*** Yes 
 sub-periods (1) vs (3) 1.03 No 0.91 No 
 sub-periods (2) vs (3) 3.96*** Yes 3.47*** Yes 
Yes: Different – No: Not different; ***: Hypothesis of equality is rejected at 1%; Note: if the 
variances are statistically different according to the Fisher test, the Satterthwaite test is used 
for comparing the average return. If not, the Pooled test is used (tests realized with SAS 
software). 
The poor risk-return of the gold investment at the Paris 
Stock Exchange 
To measure the profitability of investing in an asset, its annual income and 
fiscal situation have to be taken into account. So, the “return indices” for 
French stocks and French bonds are used. For the period from 1949 to 1992, 
the data were constructed by Gallais-Hamonno and Arbulu. For the period from 
1993 to 2003, they were collected from the Monthly Bulletin of Statistics 
(BMS) published by Insee. The annual incomes of these two assets (dividends 
for stocks and coupons for bonds) include also the tax credits16. As anyone 
knows, gold assets do not give any annual income. The Figure 2 below shows 
the three nominal evolutions: napoleon17, stock and bond indices with rein-
                                                             
16  There are two kinds of tax credits: for stocks, “avoir fiscal”; for bonds, “crédit d’impôt”. 
The “crédit d’impôt” has been suppressed for all bonds issued after 1987. For more details, 
see Gallais-Hamonno and Arbulu (1995). The sale tax is not taken into account in the fol-
lowing computations. 
17  The same problem as explained in the footnote 16 did again arise: the evolution of the ingot 
(ending at 1185) and the napoleon (ending at 926) has been too similar and to close for be-
ing distinguishable on the graph. Consequently, only the napoleon is shown. 
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vestment of annual incomes (return indices) and the consumption price index 
(CPI).  
The statistical parameters of the Paris financial assets 
Contrarily to the previous section which only focuses on the gold assets, the 
present objective is to compare these former assets with stocks and bonds, 
taking into account the fact that these latter assets distribute incomes while gold 
assets do not. 
The technical parameters of the four assets (ingot, napoleon, stocks and 
bonds) are presented in the following table and figures.  
For the whole period 
The analysis of Table 6 and Figure 3 shows that gold presents a low rate of 
return with a high level of risk in comparison with stocks and bonds. Figure 3 
shows that gold was two times less profitable than bonds (about 5%/annum for 
gold assets and 10%/annum for bonds). But gold was four times more volatile 
than bonds (about 16%/annum for gold assets and 4%/annum for bonds). On 
the other hand, gold has the same level of risk as stocks (about 16%/annum) 
but gold’s return is almost three times less important than that of stocks (about 
5%/annum for gold assets and 14%/annum for stocks). The conclusion is that 
investments in gold, as a financial asset, at the Paris Stock Exchange have 
represented a bad risk-return for the period from December 1949 to December 
2003.  
The return distributions of these four assets have two usual characteristics. 
They are asymmetric since their skewness is different from 0; they have lepto-
kurtic distribution with a kurtosis different from 3. So this makes distributions 
non-normal according to the Jarque-Bera tests. The only remarkable result is 
that ingots and napoleons had a positive Skewness, meaning that they had a 
larger probability to achieve a nominal return slightly more important than their 
average one. Moreover, napoleons had a very strong excess of kurtosis that 
reflected the extreme values obtained between 1971 and 1981.  
An interesting fact does emerge: the very low correlation between stocks 
and gold assets (-1% with napoleons and 6% with ingots). These two assets 
reacted differently to social, political and economical events. This is certainly 
due to the role of “safety” assets of gold. When the stock market developed 
rapidly from 1990 onwards, gold seemed much less attractive and investors 
realized arbitrages. This fact seemed to be the only positive feature of the gold 
assets since it means some possibilities for diversifying stocks portfolios 
(which has to be studied in another study).  
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Table 6: Distribution parameters of monthly nominal returns of gold assets, 
stocks and bonds during the whole period and sub-periods  
Assets Average (in %) 
Standard-Deviation 
(in %) Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera 
Whole period: 1950-2003 
Gold Annualized Annualized    
Ingot 5.87 16.26 1.5*** 5.26*** No*** 
Napoleon 5.48 16.86 1.85*** 13.69*** No*** 
Stocks 13.62 16.81 0.28*** 0.93*** No*** 
Bonds 9.65 4.02 0.40*** 2.80*** No*** 
3 sub-periods 
Sub-period 1: 01/1950-08/1971 
Gold Annualized Annualized    
Ingot 1.44 10.30 0.32** 4.94*** No*** 
Napoleon 2.47 12.49 -0.24 5.32*** No*** 
Stocks 13.31 14.43 0.12 0.07 Yes 
Bonds 6.96 3.18 0.77*** 6.05*** No*** 
Sub-period 2: 09/1971-09/1981 
Gold Annualized Annualized    
Ingot 29.00 25.15 0.70*** 1.41*** No*** 
Napoleon 30.71 26.96 1.82*** 6.86*** No*** 
Stocks 10.27 17.35 0.06 1.11** No** 
Bonds 12.83 5.00 0.13 3.52*** No*** 
Sub-period 3: 10/1981-12/2003 
Gold Annualized Annualized    
Ingot -0.30 15.16 0.41*** 3.48*** No*** 
Napoleon -3.01 13.45 0.21 4.47*** No*** 
Stocks 15.43 18.65 -0.58*** 0.98*** No*** 
Bonds 10.82 4.13 0.08 0.27 Yes 
The computations are made on monthly returns. For a better understanding of the values 
obtained, the results on average and on standard-deviation are annualized: annualized re-
turn=monthly return*12; annualized risk=monthly standard-deviation* 12 ; ***: signifi-
cantly different from 0 at 1%; **: at 5%; *: at 10%; Kurtosis=Excess of Kurtosis from 3. For 
the test of Jarque-Bera: ***: normality hypothesis rejected at 1%, **: at 5%, *: at 1%. 
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Figure 3: Comparison of the nominal risk-return of gold assets, stocks and 
bonds during the whole period, from 1950 to 2003 
 
For the sub-periods 
The analysis of Table 6 and Figure 4 complement what has already been seen 
and said on the three sub-periods. 
- Gold return characteristics are confirmed for three sub-periods: a weak 
return for the first one and a negative return for the third one. The only pe-
riod when gold is very profitable for French investors is the second one 
(from September 1971 to September 1981). Its annual rate of return is al-
most 30%, which is much superior to that of stocks and bonds (about 10% 
and 12%).  
- Gold had also a high level of risk in comparison with stocks and bonds. Its 
volatility exceeds that of stocks during the second sub-period (26% versus 
17%).  
- Bonds are quite stable in terms of return and risk for the three sub-periods. 
Their risk is much lower than that of gold (about 4 times lower).  
- These assets have not a normal distribution (for all assets and all sub-
periods), except the two unusual cases: the stocks returns during the first 
sub-period (1950-1971) and the bonds returns during the third one (1982-
2003).  
- The reverse relationship between gold assets and stocks was also noted in 
the sub-periods. Especially during the second sub-period, this low correla-
tion has been very remarkable (-4% with napoleons and 2.5% with ingots). 
This confirms a seemingly potential effect diversification.  
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The negative risk premium of gold assets quoted at the Paris Stock 
Exchange 
Is gold more profitable than a risk-free asset? To answer this question, the 
monthly rate of money market is used as risk-free asset. Then, the risk pre-
mium is calculated by the monthly difference of return between risky assets 
and the risk-free asset. Table 7 (next page) presents the results in annualized 
values.  
These measures confirm the fact that, over this long fifty-four-year period, 
the gold assets have had a bad risk-return characteristic since their risk-
premium is negative, meaning that gold was even less profitable than the risk-
free asset. There was an exception for the 1971-1981 sub-period when the gold 
assets skyrocketed at the annual rate of about 20%. On the other hand, stocks 
and bonds returns exceed that of the risk-free asset during the whole period and 
sub-periods. 
Investments in gold at the Paris Stock Exchange: a bad 
choice for the French investor 
The analysis of the risk-return of an asset cannot be complete if the evolution 
of the consumption prices (or inflation) is not considered. Figure 5 takes into 
account the inflation rate in the nominal series and the above results are com-
pletely changed. There is a wide difference (16 times) between nominal value 
and real values of indices for all assets.  
Although French stocks have had twenty years (1962-1981) of decline, the 
increase since the Mitterrand’s years (in spite of some crashes) had put the real 
index of stocks to 4,300, so a multiplication by 43 (related to the initial amount 
invested, 100 new francs in December 1949). For the bonds, the real multipli-
cation is only 10. But the real values of ingots and napoleons are catastrophic: 
72 and 56 new francs. As most investors have bought napoleon coins, they 
have lost about half of their long-term investment.  
Table 8 sums up the evolution of the purchasing power of these assets. We 
consider a capital of 100 new francs invested in December 1949, which was 
liquidated either at the worst month or at the best one (perfect foresight), or 54 
years later at the end of December 2003. What has got the investor in real 
terms?  
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Table 7: Annualized monthly risk premium of risky assets quoted at the Paris 
Stock Exchange during the whole period and the three sub periods (in %) 
Assets Average (in %) Standard-Deviation (in %) 
Total period: 1950-2003 
Gold 
Ingot -0.52 16.22 
Napoleon -0.91 16.86 
Stocks 7.23 16.83 
Bonds 3.26 3.90 
3 sub-periods 
Sub-period 1: 01/1950-08/1971 
Gold 
Ingot -2.62 10.30 
Napoleon -1.59 12.53 
Stocks 9.26 14.43 
Bonds 2.91 3.25 
Sub-period 2: 09/1971-09/1981 
Gold 
Ingot 19.82 25.13 
Napoleon 21.52 26.89 
Stocks 1.08 17.41 
Bonds 3.65 5.04 
Sub-period 3: 10/1981-12/2003 
Gold 
Ingot -7.69 15.21 
Napoleon -10.41 13.62 
Stocks 8.04 18.64 
Bonds 3.42 3.91 
Risk premium = difference between the return of a risky asset and the risk-free asset. The 
computations are made on monthly returns. For a better understanding of the values obtained, 
the results are annualized: annualized average = monthly average*12; annualized standard-
deviation = monthly standard-deviation* 12 . 
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Table 8: Purchasing power of the return indices for stocks and bonds and for 
gold assets (Capital of 100 invested in December 1949) 
 Ingot Napoleon Stocks Bonds 
Sale at worst time February-68 June-60 December-50 February-81 
Real value of index 39.7 44.9 81 81 
Total rate of return -60.30% -55.10% -19.00% -19.00% 
Sale at best time September-80 December-80 August-00 May-03 
Real value of index 220 295 7421 1067 
Total rate of return 120.00% 195.00% 7321.00% 967.00% 
Sale at end of 2003 72 56 4302 1047 
Total rate of return -28.00% -44.00% 4202.00% 947.00% 
Table 9: Real annual interest rate of investments in gold assets, stocks and 
bonds at the Paris Stock Exchange, from December 1949 to December 2003 
Real annual interest rate in % (geometric return) 
  1949-2003 1949-1970 1971-1981 1981-2003 
Number of years 54 21 11 22 
Gold 
Ingot: 
Nominal value 4.69 0.69 24.39 -0.33 
Real value -0.60 -4.15 12.72 -3.35 
Napoleon: 
Nominal value 4.21 1.40 25.77 -2.63 
Real value -1.05 -3.48 13.97 -5.59 
Stocks 
Nominal value 12.91 13.03 8.56 15.04 
Real value 7.21 7.60 -1.63 11.55 
Bonds 
Nominal value 10.00 7.01 13.59 11.13 
Real value 4.45 1.87 2.93 7.75 
 
Of course, these results have to take into account the length of the invest-
ment period. Table 9 below “transforms” these monetary amounts into annual 
compounded rates of interest for the whole period and sub-periods.  
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The figures in Table 9 are another way to present the poor results that have 
already brought to light.  
- Column 2 (1949-2004) shows the profitability of an investment in napoleons 
during these 54 years: the positive nominal rate of interest of 4.21% per year 
is transformed in a negative -1.05% per year in real terms. 
- Of course, this meager situation is reversed during the 1971’s decade (col-
umn 4), during which the nominal 25.8% per year means a still interesting 
12.7% per year in real terms.  
Consequently, some conclusions can be advanced here:  
- Firstly, the very important effect of inflation on investments. There is a huge 
difference between nominal and real values. For instance, in the napoleon 
case, the ended nominal value was 926 while it is only a cheap 56 when in-
flation is taken into account.  
- Secondly, as expected, the returns of each sub-period measured by the geo-
metric mean confirm the results of section 3. The only good period for gold 
has lasted ten years (1971-1981): 12% per year for ingot and 13% per year 
for napoleon coins in real term.  
Conclusion: the closing of the Paris Stock Exchange Gold 
Market in July 2004 
In July 2004, the gold market at the Paris Stock Exchange was closed. This 
happened after the decision of Crédit du Nord, one of three last institutional 
members of the gold market, to abandon its market-maker activity. A fixing 
could not be maintained any more with only two members. So, Euronext Paris 
announced the end of an official quotation for gold assets on August 2nd, 2004. 
The reasons of this closing seem straightforward and are implicitly con-
tained in the results of this study. The basic cause is the disappearance of inves-
tors. Although data on trade volumes are very scarce, the two following ones 
are very emblematic of the situation. In 1981, at the height of the speculation 
on gold, total trade volume was 6,365 millions of new francs, in 1993 (last year 
with data), these trades were only 1,957 millions of new francs (so a decrease 
of 70%).  
This behavior of investors is very understandable: why invest in a “poor” 
asset when the stocks and the bonds are so much profitable, the more so when 
the stock market is buoyant. Moreover, a high level of tax on the amount of 
sales amplified this bad risk-return. And the prohibition of import and export 
with foreign markets limits the arbitrage possibilities.  
Finally, one may wonder if the reason of this closing is not deeper than the 
pure financial reasons just mentioned: does it not reflect a change in the French 
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mentality18? With a political, economical and social environment more secure, 
the new generation of investors seems more interested in risky assets with more 
potential returns than in the former mythical safety one. It seems worth to take 
the notice that the Kuwait crisis did not have any “increasing” effect on the 
gold prices. If this hypothesis of a change in psychology were true, really it is a 
revolutionary turn from two hundred years of myth. 
Technically speaking, as a minimum supply and demand for the gold assets 
does remain (due to the huge amount which French investors are hoarding 
since the past 200 years), the former leading firm in the market, CPR Or19 
(Compagnie Parisienne de Réescompte Or), is organizing a private market and 
still publishes quotes.  
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French coins “napoléon” 
Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte 
 
English coins “sovereign” 
Elizabeth 2 
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Appendix 1: Data collected and sources 
Series Period Sources 
Gold Assets 
Monthly price of bar 12/1949-
12/2003
Archives of BDF–Cote Officielle–
website of CPR Or20
Monthly price of ingot 12/1949-12/2003 
Archives of BDF–Cote Officielle–
website of CPR Or 
Monthly price of the 20 FF coin, the “na-
poléon” 
12/1949-
12/2003 
Archives of BDF–Cote officielle–
website of CPR Or 
Monthly price of the £20 coin, the “sovereign” 12/1949-12/2003 
Archives of BDF–Cote Officielle–
website of CPR Or 
Total quarterly transactions volume (all 
coins, ingots and bars) 
1951-1993 Archives of BDF–Année Boursière 
Indices 
Index of French shares, IVFRV and 
SBF250 
12/1949-
12/2003 
Bulletin Mensuel de Statistique and 
Datastream 
Index of French bonds, IVFRF and index of 
CNO 
12/1949-
12/2003 
Bulletin Mensuel de Statistique and 
CNO 
Consumption Price Index, CPI 12/1949-
12/2003 
Annuaire Rétrospectif, 1948-1988 
and Bulletin Mensuel de Statistique 
Monetary market 
Monthly rate of monetary market 12/1949-
12/2003 
Annuaire Rétrospectif, 1948-1988 
and Bulletin Mensuel de Statistique 
 
                                                             
20  CPR Or (Compagnie Parisienne de Réescompte Or): Parisian Company of Rediscount, 
Website: http://www.cpror.com. BDF (Banque de France): Bank of France – Cote Offi-
cielle: Official Quote – IVFRV (Indice des Valeurs Françaises à Revenu Variable): French 
index of stocks – IVFRF (Indice des Valeurs Françaises à Revenu Fixe): French index of 
bonds – CNO (Comité de Normalisation Obligataire): Committee of Bond Normalization – 
Année Boursière: Stock Market Year – Bulletin Mensuel de Statistique: Monthly Bulletin of 
Statistics – Annuaire Rétrospectif: Retrospective Annual. 
